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Trade and Investment Policy in the Automotive Industry:
The Big Three and the Auto Pact
By Kenneth P. Thomas
University of Missouri - St. Louis
The u~s.-canada Auto Pact, officially known as the Automotive
Products Trade Agreement, was signed by President Lyndon Johnson
and Prime Minister Lester Pearson at the LBJ Ranch on Janua:ry 16,
"1965.
It created free trade between the two countries in the
automotive sector, but.did so in a way which largeiy reserved the
benefits for the automakers,._as opposed to .hidependent parts makers
or consumers.
This is because the abolition of tariffs applied
only to new vehicles and original equipment -parts ·(i.e., those to
be.built into the car when new) when imported and exported by auto
companies meeting North An)erican content requirements, but not to
replacement parts, used cars, or cars purchased by individuals.
This result came from tJ:ie interaction of the complex.needs of the
automakers, parts makers, the UAW, and the two governments.
This paper is part theoretical argument and part detect_ive
story.
In it I develop the argument that the elements of
international openness ( free trade- + mobility of finance a:r:id direct
-investment) are tightly intertwined and ~utually supportive. _Part
.of the reason is. that increases in '.openness along one_ dimension
strengthen the actors who will ·benefit from increasing openness
along other dimensions, thus leading to pressure for openn~ss on
those dimensions.
Another part of the interconnection is that
trade policies (just like any other policies) are fashioned with an
eye to their effect on investment.
Since investment· is.
increasingly international, governments must conside~ the effects
on inward investment as wel_l as investment by domestic owners of
capital. For this reason, trade policy outcomes are most dependent
on the preferences of those firms with the greatest investment
power.
At the same time, changes in. trade policy - such as a
reduction irt tariff barriers - can affect the intensity of
competition for investment among countries.
_
The Auto Pact is a good test because its two~country sectoral
focus lets us see the relationships between trade policy and
investment with only a few relevant actors.
Since·. there were
really only three firms which could-make the investment desired by
the Canadian government, we have a microcosm.of what usually takes
place with a much larger number of actors. · In the case of the Auto.
Pact, my arguments imply that if it_ had not been in the interest of
the Big Three automakers ._to rationalize· production,· the Canadian ·
government would" not have
been
able
to
negotiate
t:tie
intergovernmental agreement integrating the market.
Since
attracting. investment was a precondition to solving its balance-of.payments problems c;1nd increasing empioyment, Canada had no choice

1

but to design its programs in ways that would encourage the Big
Three to invest. 1
The detective story side comes from finding new empirical
evidence indicating the importance of firms' preferences for
shaping the actual outcomes in this case.
My theoretical claims
are supported by this new evidence, much of which is buried in
archives and was not available when the hitherto-best studies of
the Auto Pact took place. The auto industry has actively tried to
hide the ways in which it shaped the agreement,2 even though at
times it had a very dire'ct hand in it. To get crucial evidence on
firms' actions, I have used several confidential sources, along
with interviews with government officials.
The elements of international openness
National economies have become increasingly open in the
postwar period, especially those of the industrialized countries.
This idea of openness encompasses three elements: 1) falling trade
restrictions, as best exemplified in the GATT; ~) _increasing
mobility of financial -capital; 3) increasing mobility of direct
investment. 3 These three elements are tightly connected to each·
1

My arguments also suggest that in many cases the initiative
for trade liberalization integrating markets will come from firms
who recognize that they can efficiently integrate their production
for those markets.
2

Two examples: 1) The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
of Canada put out a study of the Auto Pact which made the false
claim that the manufacturers did not know "the specific form of
their involvement" until late November 1964, implying that the two
governments had decided everything.
(James G. Dykes, "Background
on the Automotive Products Trade Agreement," [Toronto:
MVMA,
1982], p. 51.)
In fact, the Canadian government had briefed the
firms on September 19 on how the agreement was shaping up, with a
form very similar to the final one. (Canadian National Archives,
Accession RG 20, Series B-1, Department of Industry, Mechanical
Transport Branch, File V 1021-11, pt. 2.) 2) Despite the fact that
there were numerous meetings between automakers (especially Ford)
and the Johnson administration during the negotiations, there is
virtually nothing at the LBJ Library which reflects this. A letter
from Henry Ford II to LBJ 9/16/64 is memorialized by a covering
memo with the notation "Nothing else received at Central Files."
similarly, there are a number of documents at the Canadian Nai;.ional
Archives which are secret at the companies' request.
,.
3My

view of capital mobility treats it as a potential, akin to
potential energy.
In ·other words, one should talk about the
ability to move capital (either financial or direct) rather than
the actual movements of capital when discussing capital mobility.
This is fully analyzed in my "Capital Beyond Borders: How Capital
2

other, with increases along one dimension generating political
pressures for increases along other dimensions as well. That this
should be so follows from Rogowski's analysis of trade cleavages.
He argues that the beneficiaries of expanding trade will see their
political influence increase, even if it does not necessarily mean
they will win their battles on trade ·and other issues. 4 If their
political power has increased, they can use it to push for other
policies which benefit them.
It thus remains to be shown that all . three elements of
openness favor the same actors. Rogowski argues that in a capitalrich, labor-scarce economy like the United states, freer trade
benefits capital and harms labor. 5 This seems to be borne out in
the battle lines over the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).
I have shown that increasing mobility of production
increases the bargaining power of multinational firms vis-a-vis
both governments and workers. 6
Frieden, while arguing for a
sector-specific model to understand the effects of financial
capital mobility, apfears to accept that in the long run it, too,
strengthens capital.
.
One interesting example of the connection is transport costs.
In Rogowski' s analysis, falling transport costs have an impact

Mobility Affects Bargaining Between Firms and States, 11 Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Chicago, March 1992, chapter 4.
A
similar conception, developed in the context of a libertarian
viewpoint, is found in Richard B. McKenzie and Dwight R. Lee,
Quicksilver Capital (New York: Free Press, 1991).
4

Ronald
Rogowski,
Commerce
and
Coalitions
Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 5 and 20.
5Rogowski,
611

(Princeton:

Commerce and Coalitions, pp. 119-121.

capital Beyond Borders," chapter 5.

7Jeffry

A. Frieden, "Invested Interests:
The Politics of
National Economic Policies in a world of Global Finance,"
International Organization 45, no. 4 (Autumn 1991), p. 442.
His
specific-factors model, however,
does not directly ~ddress
distributional consequences between classes rather than among
sectors. A problem for the specific-factor model occurs when labor
and capital in the same industry take opposite positions on free
trade or capital mobility, as is the case in the auto industry
today. This was identified by G.K. Helleiner as being increasingly
common way back in 1977. See Helleiner, "Transnational Enterprises
and the New Political Economy of u. s. Trade Policy," Oxford
Economic Papers 29, no. 1 . (March 1977), p. 105.
Even using a
specific-factors model, it seems to me that there will be the same
beneficiaries of increased openness in all three dimensions:
multinational corporations and international finance.
,

3

analogous to reducing trade barriers; in my work it is an indicator
of the potential mobility of production. 8
If all
three dimensions of openness have the same
beneficiaries, then it will indeed be the case that increasing
openness in any of the three ways will strengthen the proponents of
increases along the other dimensions. It is therefore unrealistic
to argue that a state should pursue a strategy of free trade while
at the same time trying to restrict capital mobility. 9
While the three dimensions are related, the two capital
mobility conditions are the most important.
Governments depend
upon the owners of capital to invest in their country in order to
achieve any of their goals; without investment there is neither
employment, nor economic activities to ta~.
Indeed, without
investment to increase domestic production, it is difficult to
attain balance of payments goals, a consideration that is important
in the case of the Auto Pact. 10 Trade policy, then, is fashioned
with an eye to its effect on investment.
Since much of this
investment is carried out by foreigners in a world of increasing
capital mobility, the effects on foreign investment must .be
considered just as much as the effects on dqmestic investors.
Trade policy also has a reciprocal effect on investment. In
particular, a reduction in tariff barriers among countries seems to
make for more intense competition for investment. 11
Trade Policy and Investment
What are the more direct relationships between trade policy
and investment? Two important combinations occur frequently.
It
has .often been the case that a tariff attracts investment from
firms that can operate behind the tariff barriers.
Examples are
Canada's National Policy of 1879,
in which Canada chose
8

Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions, p. 4; Thomas, "Capital
Beyond Borders," pp. 116 and 132; for data on falling real air
transport costs, see Table 15, p. 136.
9The

best e~ample of this position is Robert Gilpin, U.S.
Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York:
Basic Books,
1975) .
1°For

a • good survey and analysis ·. of the theory of the
structural dependence of the state on capital, see Adam Przeworski
and Michael Wallerstein, "Structural Dependence of tpe state on
Capital,'' American Political Science Review 82, no. 1 (March 1988),
pp. 11-29.
11 see

Stephen E. Guisinger; "Summary and Conclusions," in
Stephen E. Guisinger and Associates, Investment Incentives and
Performance Requirements (New York:
Praeger, 1985), p. 314, for
the argument that the most competition for investment occurs a~ong.
member countries of a common market.
4
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protectionism for its ma,nufacturers, and Import Substitution
:rndustrialization (ISI) . 12
Generally this requires a market of
sufficient size to be worth the trouble.of a foreign investor. It
frequently results in operations that are too small to take
advantage of economies of scale and - are hence uncompetitive in .
world m~rkets._ But protection from·.outside competition means that
such operations ca~ nonetheless be profitable for the firm
1
undertaking them.
·
·
In other circumstances, the adoption of freer trade can
attract investment.
This is . especially likely to happen in the
context of multinational corporations with integrated manufacturing
operations, which is to say they manufacture a large proportion of
the components to their final product. If a country has advantages
for such firms which· can reduce their costs, by adopting free trade ·
the country c.an serve as a supply station for other nations. 13 In
addition, the anticipation that free trade may bring faster
economic growth may· attract firms that want to serve a growing
market.
·
The u.s.-canada Auto Pact does not fit exactly into either of
the cases described above, though of·course it is closer to the
second case.
on the Canadian side it was an explicit trade of
tariff elimi~ation and a toleration of higher prices in Canada for
inv~stment guarantees from the automakers. Automotive tariffs were,
also eliminated by the U. s. ,/ and the overail agreement let
carmakers turther reduce their costs by accessing cheaper Canadian
labor at the same time they were able to obtain longer, more
efficient production runs.
. on the u. s. side, it was a clear
violation of Most Favored Nation norms, and it required an explicit
waiver from GATT.· Thus, while tariffs were abolished, not· everyone
could take advantage -of it. _ Individual Canadians who wanted to buy
a lower-cost North American car were stuck with whatever the Big
Three sold in Canada, because they still could not cross the bard.er
and buy a car iri" t>etroit, Buffalo, etc., on a duty;_free basis.

12

on
Canada's
National
Policy,
see · Alan
M.
Rugman,
Multinationals .and Canada-United States Free Trade (Columbia,_ South
Carolina: University of South Carolina Press,· 1990), p. 17. For.
ISI, see· Sylvia Maxfield and James H. Nolt, "Protectionism and the
Internationalization of Capital:
U.S. Sponsorship 9f Import
Substitution Industrialization in the Philippines, Turkey and
Argentina;" International Studies Quarterly 34, March 1990, · pp. 4981.

.

.

13

For this·. reason, multinational corporations
support free trade . generally.
See Helleiner,
Enterprises and the New Political Economy of U.S.
pp. 108-109, •and Helen Milner, "Resisting the
Temptation," International Organization 41, no. 4
pp. 645-47.
5

are likely to
"Transnational
Trade Policy,·11
Protectionist
(Autumn 1987),

Policy Preferences of the Main Actors
To evaluate who won and who lost in the Auto Pact, we have to
start out with who wanted what.
The main actors are the auto
manufacturers, U.S. and Canadian parts makers, the United Auto
Workers union, and the two governments.
Automakers
Chrysler and Ford were both enthusiastic about integrating
production for the two markets to improve the efficiency of their
Canadian plants.
Chrysler president Lynn Townsend extolled the
second duty rebate program (s~e below); Ford made the most d~tailed
study of . integrating production for Bladen.
Ford also began
studying the possibility of integrating part of its hub and drum
production for the two countries months. bef.ore the first duty
rebate program was. announced. 14 In line with my argument above,
this suggests that it already made economic sense to integrate the
two markets, and that the firms supported tariff changes that
further increased the advantages of doing so.
GM, on the other hand, seemed to pay more attention to how
integration would affect its relative position in the market. As
the largest producer, it had the longest and therefore most
efficient production runs.
Free trade would reduce its cost
advantage over the other producers since they would all wipe out
many
of
their
inefficiencies,
and GM apparently
opposed
integration. 15
In addition, General Motors imported over 30,000
cars annually from the United Kingdom . under the Commonweal th
Preference tariff, a benefit that would be wiped out under many
plans for reform.
GM' s apparent reluctance, despite certain
investments the company made, worried the Canadian government that
the firm would sink the prospective agreement. 16
Both AMC and Studebaker supported the idea of integrating the
two markets, with the latter, in desperate shape financially, even
14Towns~nd

s speech is in Canadian National Archives, Accession
RG 20, Series B-1, Vol. 2053, File Vl021-ll, part 1.
For Ford's
integration proposal to the Bladen Commission, see Accession RG
33/45, Vol. 18, File 52. My source on the hub and drum integration
is confidential.
I

15 see

"Canadian carmaking Has Its own Problems," Business Week,
January 26, 1963, p. 136, and James F. Keeley, "Constraints on
Canadian International Economic Policy," Ph.D. dissertation,
Stanford University, 1980, pp. 225-26 and 243-44.
16 see

State Department, Memorandum of Conversation, "Possible
Free Trade Arrangement in Automotive Products," July 7, 1964, Files
of Christian Herter, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations,
Box 15, JFKL, p. 6; and interview with C.D. Arthur, then of the
Mechanical Transport Division, Department of Industry, 8/10/92.
6

transferring all its. assembiy operations from Indiana to Ontario. 17
Under the exi~ting system of duties and content requirements, both
firms ha,d to import some components that the Big Three could afford
jto make in Canada. According to the Bladen commission, "Studebaker
paid an average duty of $85 per vehicle while General Motors paid
[only i $20. n18 ,
!Parts Makers

I

.Large mu 1 tinatio_nal
.
.
parts makers such as Borg-Warner and

I

;

. Kelsey..-Hayes generally supported the Auto !Pact. It was the smaller
· parts firms such "as Modine Manufacturing company, which saw the
inove as against their interests-.
Small Canadian parts firms had.
initially. (in their testimony before the Bladen_ Commission)
preferred protection, but in general Canadian parts firms favored
the Auto ,Pact,· partly because replacement parts were kept out of
fhe agreement. 19
UAW

--ii
The UAW,.it should be remembered, represented autoworkers on
both sides of the border until recently. The international union
*ad a consistent pro-integration· stand from the Bladen Commission
through the Auto Pact, but with proviso that there be eased
tequ.ir~ments for adj-ustmeilt assistance (which indeed were enacted).
<Canadian l.ocals had asked Bladen for more protection but supported
the Pact. Many U.S. locals opposed the agreement. 26

I

I see "Canadian _carmaking Has Its Own
l}mericari ·Motors, "Background paper, Recent
17

Problems" and, for
Trends in. Canadian
Foreign Trade," in National Security Files, Countries, Box 19,
JFKL, ·"Canada:· Subjects: Joint u.s-.-canadian Committee on Trade
~nd Economic Affairs Meeting, 3/,13/61-3/14/61 (3), Part 2 11 file;
·:for Studebaker, White House Central Files, LBJL, Box 10, File
iA6/Automotive·Parts 11/22/63..: 10/20/65.
18Report,

Royal Commission on the Automotive Industry, p. 31.

II

19on

U. s. parts makers, see Memorandum to President Johnson
from Francis Bator and Lee White, 3/25/65, White House Central
~iles, Box 156, "LE/TA 6/Ai'. file, LBJL.
For the position of
·Canadian parts makers at the Bladen Commission, see Report, Royal
Commission on the -· Automotive Industry, pp. 41-42.
For the
Jxclusion of replacement p'arts to help Canadian parts makers, see
Memorandum from Drury to Pearson, 12/17/64, Canadian National
~rchives, Accession RG 20, Series B-1, Volume 2053, File v1021-11,
t. 4, Dec. 1964-Jan. 1965.
.

I

I

.
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.
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2°Keeley,

"Constraints on Canadian International Economic
P olicy," pp. 224..:25, 234-35, and 256-57 ;- and Memorandum to
President Johnson from Francis Bator and Lee White, 3/25/65, White
1
1

1

I
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Canada
The Canadian goals in the Auto P_act negotiations and in the
duty rebate programs which preceded them were relatively
straightforward. They included a reduction in the bilateral trade
deficit in automotive products (making up.more than half of its
current.account deficit in 1962) and increased employment in the
auto .industry, both of which required more investment, primarily by
the Big Three. Finally, the auto industry was expected to hold the
1,ine on price increases. 21
\

United States
There was some division among. differ~nt u .s. government
departmen;ts.
'l'he commerce Department generaily supported · the
smaller domestic parts makers, with J!ommerce Secretary Luther
Hodges publicly_ criticizing Canada's duty rebate program.
After
Modine filed its countervailing duty complaint wit;:h the Treasury
Department, that department largely played th~ role of neutral
arbiter; however, Secretary Dillon_ tndicateci that the department
had flexibility as to its timing of an investigat;i.on should a
complaint be filed, and could drop -the mattef .should the
complainant(s) lose _ interest, which he felt unlikely in· this
case. 22
Beca,use of this stalling, the available· time for
negotiations was lengthened.
·,
The State 'Department largely wanted to avoid conflict
(especially a tra<;le war) and focus on larger GATT goals with the
;Kennedy Round coming up.
Led by George Ball, it favored
integration of the two markets- as the solution.· It was able to
point to the non-discretionary forltl of the countervailing duty law
as a way to increase pressure on the Canadians during negotiations.
The inost important thing to note about t}:lis line-up of
interest 9 is the basic congruence between Canada's goals and those
_of the automakers~- Integration .of production for the . two ,markets
would mean lowered operating costs in Canada, which meant t;hat the
Big.Three would be willing to make the investments so necessary to
the achievement of Canadian_ goals.
Interestingly enough, this
seems not to have been understood at State, where officials thought

House Central Files, Box 156, "LE/TA 6/A" file, LBJL.
21 Keeley;

"Constraints
Policy," pp. 228-31.

on

Canadian

22 see

International

Economic

Kee1ey, "Constraints on Canadian International Economic
Policy," p. 235; and Memorandum from C. Douglas Dillon to McGeorge
Bundy, 11/15/63; in National Security Files, _countries, Box 19.,
JFKL, "Canada: Subjects: Joint u.s.-canadian Committee on Trade
and Economic Affairs Meeting, 3/13/61-3/14/61 (3), Part 2 11 file.
8 '

the Canadians were out to "blackjack" the car makers, as one put
it.23

The Road to the Auto Pact
Canada's once-strong automotive industry suffered serious
problems during the 1950s and early 1960s.
From a large net
exporter of vehicles as recently as 1952, Canada by 1955 imported
more vehicles than it exported; in 1960, Canada imported 180,000
vehicles and exported only 23,000. 24
Moreover, the country had
a large deficit in auto parts - C$290 million in 1960 - virtually
all of it with the u.s. 25 Not only were exports down, so was totql
production, with auto production falling from 375,000 in 1955 to
298,000 in 1958, and truck production decreasing from 120,000 in
1953 to 61, ooo in 1958. Production employment in the industry also
fell, from 44,000 in 1956 to between 39,000 and 33,000 in the years
1958-60. 26
A large part of the reason for this was that its
production was controlled by the Big Three automakers, whose
subsidiaries in what had been strong export markets such as
Australia and the U.K. began to be supplied more and more by their
subsidiaries in those countries.
The auto industry thus contributed to a declining balance of
payments position for Canada into the early 1960s.
A Royal
Commission was appointed to study the problem of the auto industry
and what could be done about it.
Dean Vincent Bladen of the
University of Toronto,
the sole commissioner, was heavily
influenced by a plan published by Hugh Keenleyside that would give
individual companies in any country duty-free trade in both
directions if they would agree to place an appropriate amount of
their production in Canada. 27 Bladen asked the auto companies to
consider the possibility of integrating their production on both
sides of the border, in which case it might be possible for some
models to be produced only in Canada, but most models sold in
Canada would not be produced there.
This would enable the
23Robert

o.
Keohane
and
Joseph
s .,
Nye,
Power
Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), p. 207.
24 Report,

and

Royal Commission on the Automotive Industry, p. 15,

Table II.
25 carl

E. Beigie, The Canada-u.s. Automotive Agreement:
An
Assessment (Montreal: Canadian-American Committee, 1970), p. 36,'
Table 8.
26

Keeley, "Constraints
Policy," p. 221.

on

Canadian

27see

International

Economic

Keeley, "Constraints on Canadian International Economic
Policy," p. 225. Keenleyside's original article is "Treatment for
our Lopsided U.S. Trade," Financial Post, 5/7/60, p. 1.
9

companies to get rid of their inefficiently short production runs
in Canada. 28 Ford went the furthest in studying the possibility
of such integration, and recommended that strong consideration be
given to it, while GM only submi:tted the idea of producing
automatic transmissions in Canada, and then only if the Canadian
government would give the company all sorts of concessions. 29
Bladen ultimately proposed what he called "extended content,"
the idea being that instead of having to have 60% (for the Big
Three; less for AMC and Studebaker-Packard) Commonwealth content on
vehicles produced in Canada, companies had to have 60% content of
vehicles produced in Canada+ imports but that exports could be
used to meet the content requirement. 36
,
The Canadian government set up an interdepartmental Committee
t;o Study the Bladen Report, with Simon Reisman as its chair, a·nd it
was this committee which made the proposal for the duty rebate
programs. In the first, effective 11/1/62, the previous exemption
of automatic transmissions from duty was made contingent on
increasing exports over _the previous year.
Also included were
stripped engines, an ambiguous term that may have been a special
provision for an individual firm (in the committee's discussions,
there was talk of exempting a small number of engines for each firm
so that AMC and Studebaker would nqt have to keep eating duty for
engines which they could not afford to make in Canada.
It would
also help the Big Three with engines they used in very small
quantities and also imported. ) .
General Motors responded in
February 1963 with a
decision to begin making automatic
transmissions in Canada by converting an engine plant in Windsor,
Ontario, to transmissions. 31
,
28That

production runs in the Canadian auto industry were
inefficiently short was widely known. For example, on February 17,
1953, Ford Canada president Rhys Sale told the House of Commons,
"Without the tariff, we could not possibly compete with the United
States manufacturers, and the reason is solely one of volume. In
1952 the Canadian industry produced 435,000 cars and trucks for the
domestic and export markets. Production in the United States was
5,555,000.
Because the volume in the U.S. is 13 times that in
Canada, unit costs of production are substantially lower." Cited
in James G. Dykes, Background on the Automotive Products Trade
Agreement (Toronto:
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association,
1982), p.26.
29canadian

National Archives., Briefs submitted to the Royal
Commission on the Automotive. Industry, Accession RG 33/45, Volume
18, File 41A (GM confidential submission) and File 52 (Ford
confidential brief).
30Report,

Royal Commission on the Automotive Industry, pp. 67-

73.
31 see

"New GM Plant to Hire 1,750," Windsor Star,· 3/19/64.
10

Since this program was introduced in the midst of a serious
balance-of-payments crisis for Canada, the U.S. reaction was muted.
In October 1963, however, the Canadians introduced an expanded
version of the duty rebate program which covered all automotive
products, including completed vehicles. While the Canadians were
trying to figure out exactly what shape it should take, Chrysler
(of Canada) official John MacMillan was in Ottawa telling Canadian
officials that if the export incentive program were "satisfactory,"
Chrysler would put a planned engine plant in Windsor rather than
Michigan. Evidently the new program satisfied Chrysler, although
the plan did not completely follow its preferences (including
completed cars, which Chrysler did not favor), because the company
subsequently expanded the engine plant in Windsor as promised. 32
Canadian archives show clearly that the program was designed
to attract investment, and the Departments of Industry and Finance
expended a great deal of effort to ensure that sales taxes, the
corporate income tax, dividend withholding policy, etc., did not
dilute this investment-attracting function. 33
Although their
ultimate goals were an improvement in the balance of payments and
obtaining employment, it was obvious to them that they could only
do this in ways that induced the automakers to invest more in
Canada.
The . Canadians fully recognized that the new duty rebate
program was an export subsidy, but did not worry about it too much
because a) lots of other cou~tries, including the U.S., subsidized
their exports; 34 b) they felt it was of a sort that did not violate
32

Memo 9/26/63 from C.A. Annis to Reisman, Canadian National
Archives, Department of Industry, Accession RG 20, Series B-1, Vol.
2066, File V8001-260/A4 - Auto industry 1963-65 .. On Chrysler's
engine expansion in Windsor, see "Auto Industry's 'Big 3' Grow Even
Bigger," Financial Post, April 3, 1965.
33 canadian

National Archives, Accession RG 20, Series B-1,
Volume 2052, File v1021-10 ,' pt. 2, Memo from MacDonald to Barrow
2/10/64.
34That

the U.S. also had such programs is shown most clearly
in "Legal Aspects of the Canadian Plan for an Import Rebate Export
Subsidy on Automotive Parts, 11 by John c. Wagner, Office of General
Counsel, Department of Commerce, 9/12/63.
He said a potential
problem with countervailing duties against the Canadians was that
"we anticipate the somewhat artificial encouragement of our own
exports under the proposed legislation for tax benefits to new
American exports. ,. If we impose, after finding of subsidy,
countervailing duties on the Canadian exports, we undercut our
hopes that foreign countries will not object to or retaliate
against any tax break we give our own businessme~ for expanding
exports. 11
John F. Kennedy Library, Files of Christian Herter,
Special Representative for Trade Negotiation·s, Box 7, "Canadian
Automobile Parts" file.
1
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GATT rules; c) under GATT, to apply countervailing duties a
petitioner had to show injuryo Unfortunately for them, under U.S.
Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, a petitioner did not have to
show injury, and there was virtually no discretion involved in the
Process. As soon·as the program was announced, small independent
parts makers started complaining to the Department of Commerce, and
subsequently Commerce Secretary Luther Hodges publicly criticized
the Canadian program.
As of Nov. 4, four companies had already
complained. 35
Various official complaints were lodged with the
Bureau of Customs, but for a while that arm of Treasury stonewalled
them.
On April 15, 1964, however, Modine Manufacturing Co., a
radiator maker in Wisconsin, filed a complaint that was technically
perfect and the Treasury Department took up the question in detail
of whether the duty rebate program constituted a "bounty or grant, 11
the technical test for whether countervailing duties would be
.
.
applied. 36
While independent parts makers were opposed, the Big Three
were very happy with the program.
Henry Ford apparently ?raised
the program to Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson. 3
Lynn
Townsend strongll endorsed it in a speech' at the Empire Club of
Canada 2/24/64. 8
GM announced several major investments,.
including a new assembly plant at ste.-Therese, Quebec, and a trim
plant at Windsor, Ontario. Ford said it would' make a major move in
Canada, and in 1964 it announced-a truck plant at its main complex
in Oakville, Ontario. 39 Behind the scenes, it was studying a wide

35

John F. Kennedy Library, Files of Christian Herter, Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations, Box 7, telephone message
, from Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., to Herter, 11/4/63.
36

James Keeley, "Cast in Concrete for All Time? The Negotiation
of the Auto Pact," Canadian Journal of Political science XVI: 2,
June 1983, p. 287.
The internal quote comes from United states,
Department of State, memorandum of conversation, "Auto Parts," June
25, 1964.
37so

Walter Gordon told Dean Rusk.
See Telegram, Rusk to
Butterworth, 11/8/63, "Canada General 10/10/63 - 11/8/63" folder,
National Security Files, countries, Box 19, John F. Kennedy
Library.
38The

text is found in Canadian National Archives, Accession
Number RG 20, Series B-1, Volume 2053, File Vl021-ll pt. 1.
39on

Ste. -Therese, see "GM Unit in Canada Plans to Build Auto
Plant North of Montreal," Wall Street Journal, May 4, 1964, p. 5.
on the GM Windsor trim plant, see "New GM Plant to Hire 1,750,"
Windsor star, March 19, 1964.
For the Oakville Truck plant, see
"Ford of Canada Starts Building of $25 Million Truck Plant in
Ontario," Wall Street Journal, August 28, 1964, p. 3.
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range of ways to increase its Canadian content. 40 - In addition,
because the duty rebates potentially made Canadian production
cheaper than U.S. production for a wide range of parts, it began
putting pressure on its U. s. suppliers ·1 to reduce their prices to
Ford, saying it could shift to Canadian supply cheaper. 41 Moreover,
Ford " ... urged ,some of its supplie~s to buy more of their parts
ingredients from Canada. 1142 Finally, Studebaker, which was in very
bad shape financially, closed its plant in South Bend, Indiana, and
moved all final assembly work to its· Hamilton, Ontario,, plant. 43
Diplomatic discussions began with the United states even
before the new program was introduced.
U.S. officials told the
Canadians that they underst:ood their motivations for the program,
but in.formed· them that the countervailing duty process was not
discretionary. 44
Reports from the Treasury Department suggested
that Modine would probably win its ,case, arguing.that if Mod:i,,ne
won, the courts would clearly uphold the decision, whereas_ if
Modine lost at that.level, there was a very good chance that the
·
courts would reverse on appeal. 45
The U.S. favored some sort of integration of the industry as
its preferI:ed solution, an idea which seems to have conte •from
George Ball, Under-secretary of state. 46 Indeed.,. tr. s. negotiators
told their Canadian counterparts on July 7, 1964, that even·lf the
rationalization of . the
industry meant
Canada
received a
disproportionate share of new investment, that would be an
~Confidential sburce.
41

confidential interview with parts maker, 8/14/92.

42John

F. Kennedy Library, Files of Christian Herter, Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations, Box 7, telepnone message
from Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., to :H;erter, 11/4/63.
43

White House· Central Files, Box 10, File TA6/Automotive Parts
11/22/63 - 10/20/65, LBJL. Report of the US Tariff Commission on
HR 6960, the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965.
for instance, telegram, Dean Rusk to Butterworth (U .s.
Ambassador to. Canada) , 11/8/63, ."Canada General 10/10/63 - 11/8/63"
folder, National Security-Files, Countries, Box 19, John F. Kennedy
Library ..
44 see,

45 Telegram,

Rusk· to Butterworth 11/14/63, "Canada, G~neral
11/9/63 - 12/2/6311 folder, National Security Files,· Country Files,
John F. Kennedy Library.
46 rnterview

with Sidney Weintraub, Lyndon B. Johnson School of.
Public;: Administration, university of Texas, 7/23/9_2. Weintraub was
in the State.Department at t;he time and said that he first heard of
the integrationist idea from Ball.
He speculated that Ball may
ultimately have gotten it from the companies.
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acceptable outcome.
One U.S. negot~ator reported that that was
exactly what the auto makers told him would be the outcome of free
trade in automotive products between the · two countries. 47 Canada,
however, insisted on some sort of prqduction guarantees to
accompany tariff removal, which the state Department was not
willing to include in I an intergovernmental agreement.
This
disagreement led to an impasse in t_he talks at their August 1 7
meeting.
Ultimately; the two pieces were decoupled, -with the
Canadians negotiating the production guarantees directly with car
makers in Letters of Undertaking.
_
In November, when the agreement's final outlines were clear,
Herbert Wilson of the White House ·staff app~oached Ford lobbyist
Rod Markley to get his assessment of Wilbur Mills' likeJ,.y reaction
to it. Markley did not know, but promised to have Henry Ford II
approach Mills to find out his views, without mentioning that-the
Johnson Administration was -behind his asking. 48 Evidently, Mills
considered the agreement satisfactory, as he became the sponsor of
the implementing legislation in the House of Representatives, and
LBJ felt he was able to go ahead and finalize the agreement. All
that remained then was for Canada to obtain Letters-of Undertaking
from the main automakers; as: soon as they were in hand, Pearson and
Johnson signed the agreement.
The Letters of Undertaking provided one final means by whicp
t}?.e Big Three affected the _shape · of the Pact.
Ford was· able·_ to
veto .a plan to exclude large trucks from the agreement, something
the Canadian government was considering to help two small domestic
truck producers, by thre~tening not to give a commitment on th_e
government's overall program. 49 GM used its negotiations to raise
again _the qµestion of what was expected to happen to t~e price
dif ferentiai between U. s. and can~dian cars.
The company's
rel?rese:r:itatives _were told by th~ canad-ians ,th~t theJ understood the
price differential would not disappear overnight.
47Memorahdum of Conversation, "Possible Free Trade Arrangements
in A~tomotive Products," July 7, 1964, Files of Christian Herter,
Special Representative for Trade Negotiat,ions_, Box 15, John F.
Kennedy Library, pp. 1, 4.
J

48LBJ Library', Aides, Files of Herbert Wilson, Memo, Wilson to
Bill Moyers,· li/25/64.
,-

49:sarrow to Reisman, 12/23/64.
cana~ian National Archiyes,
Accession RG 20, Serie_s B-1, Vol. 2053, File v10_21-11, pt. 4.
50 c.o.

Arthur Memo to File 12/4/64 re 11/26 meeting with GM,
Canadian National Archives, Accession RG 20, Series B-1, Vol·. 2053,
File v-1021-11, pt._ 3.
David L.- Emerson argues that mainta.ining
some of the price differential· was the price paid by the Canadian
government for securing the ce>operatio"n of the auto companies. See
Emerson, Production, Location and the Automotive Agreement (Ottawa:
Economic Council of Canada, 1975), - PP• 70-76. This would appear to·
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The agreement's provisions included the removal of tariff
baJ;"riers for qualified manufacturers, allowing the duty-free export
and import of vehicles and original-equipment parts.
These
privileges did not, . however, apply to consumers, nor to the
replacement parts market. As a result, the benefits were l~rgeiy
restricted to the. automakers who·; in return, had to maintain a
minimum proportion of their production in Canada· to remain
"qualified" under· the agreement's meaning. 51
The afteriQ.ath of the Auto Pact was.that,·as agreed in their
Letters of Undertaking, the.Big Three increased their investment in
Canada.
More importantly for the future, Canada and the United
states had been put into more direct competition for automotive
investment. This was shown most clearly in the bidding war ·between
Ontario and Oh1o for a Ford engine·plant in 1978, ultimately won by
the former. 52
Winners and Losers
The general congruence of interest between the automakers and
the ,canadian government led to an overall outcome that favored both
their positions. The. b. S. government, to the extent it favored the
position of the B1g Three for integration, had little conflict with
the Canadians, but its efforts to avoid production guarantees
failed. The Big Three·were willing to give production guarantees
because integration of production for th~ two·ni.arkets indeed meant
that they would put a disproportionate share of their investment in
Canada on tne basis. of cost alone.
In the abstract,·. the firms
would have preferred ·not to have a local content or value-added
requirement, and to have ·been free to locate prodµction wherever it
would be least expansive for them to produce and distribute
autoniob_iles.. In 1964-5, however, this conflict with the Canadi~,ns
was latent, because the savings from efficient production in Canada
made the Pact's 60% Canadian value-added requirement something they
would have achieved anyway. 53
(·The c;lUtomakers· .. may f inal~y get
their way on this now-open conflict if the North American Free
Trade Agreement is approved.) The longer-run balance-of-payments
effects favored Canada and hurt the United·States.
Modine and other smaller parts makers· in U ~ s. were hurt by the
agreement because it basically legalized the pre-existing• Canad;i.an
program. The same is probably true for some smaller parts makers
have been especially important for GM, because as the. largest
producer it had the most to gain from higher prices, whereas other
aspects of the agreement eroded its #1 ·competitive position.
51 For

the text of the agreement,
Automotive Agreement, pp. 139-144.

see Beigie,

Canada-U. S.

52 see

Thomas, "Capital Beyond Borders,'" pp: 212-215.

53 see

Thomas, 11capital Beyond Borders," pp. 205-207.
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in Canada, because as the Big Three bought out some of their
Canadian suppliers, it is reasonable to suppose they favored them
over independent Canadian parts producers.
The United Auto Workers came out of the battle unscathed, as
Canadian workers benefitted from the increased investment and the
union was able to obtain expanded trade adjustment assistance for
U.S. members threatened by the pact. 54
· Finally, Canadian consumers did not see all of benefits of
integration because of persistence of much of price differential. 55
Conclusion
The Auto Pact gives us a striking example of investment power
being fungible into control over trade policy outcomes, as shown by
the Big Three's tremendous influence on the final outcome. First,
the intergovernmental agreement simply could not have been achieved
without the Letters of Undertaking from the firms.
Canadian
negotiators repeatedly expressed their fear that General Motors
could sink the whole agreement by itself.
Second, the companies
achieved their two biggest goals, "free trade" for themselves, and
the maintenance of .a major portion of the· price differential
between the two markets, the latter being especially important to
GM.
Third, Ford was able to veto the exclusion of heavy trucks
from the intergovernmental agreement. And the documentary record
shows that the companies had frequent high-level contacts with both
governments while the negotiations were taking place.
The fact
that the White House used Ford to sound out Wilbur Mills is
especially indicative of the closeness of these business-government
contacts.
This outcome should be no surprise.
Given the ownership
pattern
of
the
Canadian
automobile
industry,
and
the
extraordinarily high barriers to entry, the only way for Canada to·
get the automotive investment it wanted was to undertake programs
which satisfied the interests of the. Big Three. The firms had this
54 Keeley,

"Constraints on Canadian International Economic
Policy," p. 256; "U.S., Canada Agree to Drop Tariffs," Wall Street
Journal, 18 January 1965, p. 24.
55

Emerson, Production. Location and the Automotive Agreement,
pp. 73-74, argues that the price differential between the two
countries was not much different from the extra cost of building
cars in Canada. His own data, however, show that on three popular
models the factory prices were 5%, 6%, and 10% higher in Canada,
while the cost difference per car in final assembly was only 4.3%.
Moreover, his•data showed that parts production was less expensive
in Canada than the U.S., and this should reduce the differential
for the total cost of cars in the two countries.
Thus, there
appears to be a case for the existence of excess profits in his
base year of 1969. Moreover, subsequent to.1969, the differential
increased, rather than decreasing, as it had been predicted to do.
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power because of the government's need for investment as a
precondition for accomplishing either of its main goals, improving
the balance of payments and increasing employment.
Not only did
the overall agreement have· to be compatible with the Big Three's
interests, as.shown above the companies were able to dictate in
detail the content of the intergovernmental agreement on several
points.
And in both details and the overall shape of the
agreement, , the Canadian government attached more weight to the
preferences of the Big Three than to Canadian parts makers or to
small Canadian truck makers.
This does not mean that firms with investment power will
always get. their way on trade policy. They are-not the only actors
with power on· these issues.
The UAW, for example, favored the
removal of automotive tariffs as long as its U.S. members received
adjust~erit assistance, which it successfully obtaineci. But had the
UAW favored tariff removal and the Big Three had not, there would
not have been an Auto Pact. Today, the Big Three favors the NAFTA,
and the UAW opposes it~ It will probably be.approved.
Moreover, governments .can resist the pressure Qf firms to
integrate areas economically·.
However, · if they do so, they will
pay a price for it.
Because s.ometimes governments can tolerate
these prices there is no automatic mechanism from potential
integration to ..trade changes.
:aut this price will rise with
increasing capital mobility. In the case of the protected Canadian
~utomobile market, the price of maintaining an uncompetitive auto
sector was that cars sold for. more in Canada than in the U. s. , 56
that exports fell, and consequently employment fell, also. After
19.60, the mobil.i ty of production in the auto industry increased• due
to the introduction of tri-level rail cars, which reduced the cost
of transporting finished automobiles, and made it economically
preferable for gUtomaker~ to have centralized plants specialize in
one or two models to supply all of North America rather than to let
decentralized plants supply all the models for their immediately
surrounding areas. 57 Thus Canada faced~ increasing costs ( compared
with integrating the two markets) if it continued protecting the
automobile sector.
·
Filced with this pressure, Canada finally decided· to stop
paying the costs of p:r:-otection. The Big Three, already benefitting
from increased capital mobility, were .able to, gain tariff abolition
as well.
With the removal of tariffs, a new era in the North
American automotive industry began.

56Moreover,

this· price differential had been increasing in the ·
. late·l950s and early 1960s. Telephone interview with C.D .. Arthur,
8/21/92.
57James

M. Rubenstein, "The Changing Distribution · of . U.S.
Automobile A~sembly Plants," Focus 38, no. 3 (Fall 1988), p. 14. ,,.,
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